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We  examine  how  R&D  portfolios  of  drug  pipelines  affect  pharmaceutical  licensing, 
controlling firm size, diversity, and competitors in R&D and product markets. The data 
collected  comprises  329  license-outs  and  434  license-ins  closed  by  54  Japanese 
pharmaceutical  companies  between  1997  and  2007.  We  pay  special  attention  to 
stage-specific licensing by dividing the innovation process into an early stage and a late 
stage.  Estimates  from  the  fixed-effect  GMM  model  reveal  that  drug  pipelines 
significantly affect stage-specific licensing. Particularly, the state of drug pipelines is 
leveled off by license-outs at the early stage and license-ins at the late stage. Theoretical 
implications are also discussed. 
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Over the past two decades, utilizing markets for technology through licensing and other 
outsourcing arrangements has emerged as a key to organizing innovative activity (Arora 
et  al.,  2001a).  The  coordination  of  internal  and  external  knowledge  across  a  firm’s 
boundary  is  now regarded as the core of R&D management, especially  in  high-tech 
industries.  Obviously,  it  is  virtually  impossible  and  never  desirable  for  all  relevant 
technologies  to  be  developed  by  a  single  firm  (Stephan,  1996;  Narin  et  al.,  1997; 
Chesbrough, 2003). It is, therefore, very probable that the incentive to utilize markets for 
technologies is closely associated with R&D portfolios at various stages of acquisition, 
accumulation,  and  exploitation  of  knowledge  throughout  the  innovative  process 
(Lichtenthaler and Ernst, 2006).  
The pharmaceutical industry is, arguably, the leading industry in which markets 
for technology have rapidly grown and are actively utilized (Arora and Gambardella, 
2010). This paper examines how R&D portfolios of pharmaceutical firms affect licensing 
decisions, controlling firm size, therapeutic diversity, and the degree of competition in 
R&D as well as product markets. The R&D portfolio of a pharmaceutical firm is mainly 
reflected in drug pipelines that consist of drug candidates under clinical testing as well as 
approved  drugs  being  marketed
1.  Luckily,  drug  pipelines  can  be  observed  quite 
accurately owing to the rigorous regulatory process of clinical testing: pre-clinical, phase 
I,  phase  II,  phase  III ,  and  post  marketing  surveillance  (PMS).  Accordingly,  the 
pharmaceutical  industry  is  a  suitable  candidate  for  examining  the  effect  of  R&D 
portfolios on licensing. 
Licensing can be a possible way of smoothing  out the state of drug pipelines 
across stages. The change of drug pipelines would dictate a licensing decision as a result 
of the portfolio adjustment process. We will refer to this causality as a portfolio effect. For 
example, a firm with relatively richer drug candidates at one stage than at other stages 
will be likely to license some of the drug candidates outward at that stage. In contrast, if 
the number of drug candidates at a stage is diminishing compared to other stages, inward 
                                                   
1 The  present  paper  could  not  utilize  detailed  data  on  project-based  R&D  expenditures.  Although 
pharmaceutical  patents  are  frequently  used  in  empirical  studies,  they  mainly  reflect  upstream  drug 
discovery research. The state of drug pipelines, however, can be regarded as a useful proxy for the portfolio 
of pharmaceutical R&D, because resource allocation among pharmaceutical research projects within a firm 
would be at least partly reflected in the distribution of drug candidates across therapeutic categories. 3 
licensing at that stage would be accelerated to level off the drug pipelines across the 
stages. 
In a recent theoretical  study, Chan et al. (2007) provide a  model of project 
selection that explicitly incorporates R&D pipelines, transaction costs, and downstream 
complementary assets such as distribution channels and brands. Chan et al. examine the 
investment and licensing decisions by using a dynamic programming technique, and they 
indicate that the state of R&D pipelines and the existence of downstream complementary 
assets affect the optimal R&D portfolio as well as the incentive to use the technology 
market at different R&D stages. The theoretical study by Chan et al. corroborates our 
empirical  motivation  to  clarify  the  significant  role  of  drug  pipelines  in  licensing 
decisions. 
However, very few empirical studies in the literature explore the influence of 
R&D portfolios on inward or outward licensing, except for the technology transaction 
through mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) suggested that 
the  bleak  prospect  of  drug  pipelines  induced  M&A  between  U.S.  pharmaceutical 
companies. Using data on 160 pharmaceutical firms’ acquisitions from 1994 to 2001, 
they defined the desperation index, consisting of the state of drug pipelines and their 
remaining patent lengths, and found that firms with fewer drug candidates likely acquired 
other firms. Danzon et al. (2007) obtained virtually similar results by using M&A data of 
383 pharmaceutical firms from 1988 to 2001. 
Most  previous  studies  focused  on  complementary  assets  as  a  significant 
determinant of licensing (Teece, 1986; Montalvo and Yafeh, 1994; Arora et al., 2001a, 
2001b; Shane, 2001; Kollmer and Dowling, 2004; Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006; Fosfuri, 
2006; Gambardella et al., 2007). That is, a firm with complementary assets would absorb 
knowledge more effectively and exploit profit opportunities more efficiently, thereby 
exploiting its own inventions internally rather than acquiring royalties by licensing them 
out. 
As the theoretical literature points out, there are two conflicting effects with 
which a licensor’s profit varies and the incentives to license change accordingly (Arora 
and Fosfuri, 2003). One is the revenue effect, which enhances a licensor’s profit with 
royalties paid by licensees, and the other is the rent dissipation effect, which erodes a 
licensor’s profit by intensifying competition due to a licensee’s entry into the licensor’s 4 
market. Therefore, the more competition at the R&D and marketing stages, the higher the 
incentive to license to horizontal rivals. This is because the revenue effect outweighs the 
rent  dissipation  effect.  That  is,  firms  faced  with  severe  competition  are  marginally 
exposed to a small rent dissipation effect by licensing their technologies out to rivals, and 
they can obtain large royalty revenues through licensing because there are many potential 
licensees.  We  will  consider  the  competition  effect  on  licensing,  reflecting  the  two 
conflicting strategic effects. 
The data that we collected through Asuno Shinyaku (the comprehensive database 
of drug developments and alliances of Japanese pharmaceutical firms) comprises 329 
license-outs  and  434  license-ins  closed  by  54  Japanese  pharmaceutical  companies 
between 1997 and 2007 with various types of counterparts such as horizontal rivals and 
bio-ventures. We will define a portfolio of drug pipelines and classify the process of drug 
innovation into an early stage and a late stage. Thus, we will pay special attention to the 
stage-specific determinants of licensing, which are not fully explored in the literature. 
We  assume  that  downstream  complementary  assets  (such  as  statisticians, 
collaborative networks with physicians, and medical representatives) and the therapeutic 
diversity of existent drug pipelines are determined prior to licensing decisions. Then, we 
consider that drug pipelines are endogenously determined, because inward and outward 
licensing will result in different configurations of drug pipelines. That is, drug pipelines 
influencing  a  firm’s  license  decision  are  themselves  influenced  by  a  firm’s  license 
activity. 
Estimates from the fixed-effect Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) model 
controlling endogeneity, using lagged variables as instruments, reveal that drug pipelines 
significantly affect stage-specific licensing. In particular, the Japanese pharmaceutical 
companies level off the state of drug pipelines by license-outs at the early stage and by 
license-ins at the late stage. That is, the number of drug candidates at the early stage is 
positively associated with license-outs (license-ins) at the early stage (late stage). On the 
other hand, the number of drug candidates at the late stage is negatively correlated with 
license-outs (license-ins) at the early stage (late stage). 
Furthermore, we find that a pharmaceutical firm with larger sales is more likely 
to  introduce  external  drug  candidates  at  the  late  stage.  Therefore,  downstream 
complementary  assets,  which  are  construed  as  absorptive  capacity,  strengthen  the 5 
propensity  to  license-in.  In  contrast,  the  extent  of  R&D  competition  enhances  the 
propensity to license-out, presumably due to a marginally small rent dissipation effect. 
This  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  explains  our  classification  of 
licensing  stages  and  the  definitions  of  drug  pipelines.  It  also  gives  an  overview  of 
pharmaceutical  licensing  in  Japan.  Section  3  presents  the  theoretical  and  empirical 
background of the portfolio effect and other factors affecting licensing decisions. Section 
4 describes the data sources, empirical specifications, and variable constructions. Section 
5 presents the estimation results. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Drug pipelines and pharmaceutical licensing in Japan 
 
2.1. Drug pipelines and licensing stages 
New drug development is a sequential process. The upper part of Figure 1 presents the 
typical  innovation  process  of  pharmaceuticals.  Quite  a  few  drug  candidates  at  the 
discovery stage are screened for synthesis by chemists and biologists in order to develop 
concepts for new compounds. Once a new compound has been synthesized, it is screened 
for pharmacologic activity and toxicity in vitro and in animals (pre-clinical testing), and 
thereafter in humans
2. Human clinical testing typically comprises three distinct stages, 
phase I, phase II, and phase III, each of which involves different types of testing on safety 
and efficacy. Phase I is performed on a small number of healthy human subjects in order 
to obtain information on toxicity and safe dosage ranges. Phase II is performed on a larger 
number of humans who are patients for whom the drug is intended to be prescribed. Phase 
III involves large-scale trials on patients. The later a clinical trial is conducted, the greater 
its  cost.  Therefore,  it  is  important  for  a  pharmaceutical  firm  to  screen  promising 
candidates as efficiently as possible (DiMasi et al., 2003).  A pharmaceutical firm will 
submit a list of drug candidates that are supported by phase III clinical testing to the 
Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) (pre-registration). An approved drug is 
subsequently registered and listed with the reimbursement price. Finally, a marketed drug 
                                                   
2 The Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Agency (PMDA) conducts reviews and related services on 
pharmaceuticals and medical devices for marketing authorization in accordance with the Pharmaceutical 
Affairs Law in Japan. 6 
is subject to post marketing surveillance (PMS).  
 
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
 
  We divided the drug innovation process into the early stage and late stage, as 
shown  in the  lower part of Figure 1. Specifically,  following Higgins and Rodriguez 
(2006), the early stage comprised the pre-clinical phase and phase I, and the late stage 
comprised all the stages after phase I.
3 We accordingly categorized drug candidates and 
licensing contracts by the two stages. Note that there are mainly three practical reasons 
for this classification
4. First, clinical testing at the late stage (i.e., phase II and phase III) 
requires much higher costs than at the early stage (i.e., pre-clinical and phase I). Second, 
there is a fast -truck clinical testing procedure  applied  for  life-threatening  or  highly 
effective drug candidates such as anti-cancer drugs and orphan drugs. This procedure 
rendered classification of drug candidates between phase II and phase III quite obscure 
and virtually impossible. Finally, the transition probability of clinical testing from phase I 
to phase II is much lower than the success rates of subsequent stages (DiMasi et al., 2003). 
This distinction between the early stage and the late stage help s to clarify a significant 
strategic effect of drug pipelines on licensing. 
 
2.2. Stage-specific pharmaceutical licensing by firm size 
Table 1 presents the stage-specific licensing activities of 54 Japanese pharmaceutical 
firms for the years 1997 to 2007. The calculated values represent the annual average 
number of licenses per firm. Table 1 classifies the number of license-ins and license-outs 
by firm size measured by drug sales: (i) large firms (sales ≧400 billion yen), (ii) medium 
firms (400＞sales＞100), and (iii) small firms (100 ≧sales). This table shows that a large 
firm is likely to close a license-in contract. The annual average license-ins per firm is 
much higher in large firms (2.19) than in medium firms (0.74) and small firms (0.62). The 
bigger the firm size, the more license-ins contracts are closed at any stage (although the 
                                                   
3 In an unreported examination, we included all stages after pre-registration as a third stage. Furthermore, 
in another unreported examination, we marked the boundary between phase 2 and phase 3. We obtained 
virtually similar results at a slightly lower significance level compared to the present study. Therefore, we 
hereafter report the empirical results based on the early/late classification. 
4 Unfortunately, we found no information on the number of drug seeds at the discovery stage. 7 
standard deviations are quite large). On the other hand, there is no significant correlation 
between firm size and license-outs. 
 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
 
 
2.3. Pharmaceutical licensing by domestic and foreign partners 
Figure 2 presents the trends of pharmaceutical licensing  by Japanese pharmaceutical 
firms with foreign and domestic partners from 1997 to 2007. There are three points worth 
noting.  First,  the  number  of  license-ins  and  license-outs  moved  roughly  in  parallel, 
although the numbers for licensing with domestic partners fluctuated more widely than 
those  for  licensing  with  foreign  partners.  Second,  inward  licensing  always  exceeds 
outward licensing, probably because there are many foreign and domestic licensors such 
as bio-ventures, universities, and foreign pharmaceutical firms.  Third, the number of 
license-ins between 2000 and 2002 is  slightly  large. Slow introduction of  molecular 
biology  in  the  late  1990s  in  Japan  (Henderson  et  al.  1999)  and  the  introduction  of 
biotechnologies in the early 2000s by the Japanese pharmaceutical firms (Motohashi, 
2007) possibly reflect the active license-ins during this period
5. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 around here] 
 
 
3. Factors affecting licensing decisions 
 
3.1. Portfolio effect 
It is crucial for a pharmaceutical firm to keep a well-balanced portfolio, since releasing 
new  drugs  continuously  secures  stable  cash  flow  and  facilitates  efficient  use  of 
complementary assets. Licensing can be a possible means of smoothing the state of drug 
                                                   
5 In addition, the Japanese government enacted the Technology Licensing Office (TLO) Act in 1998 and the 
Japanese  Bayh-Dole  Act  in  1999  to  promote  industry-university  collaboration.  These  policy  changes 
facilitated the Japanese pharmaceutical firms to contract collaborative research with universities and other 
public research  institutes  (Okada  et  al.  2009).  Moreover, recent  trends  enforcing  stronger intellectual 
property rights may reduce uncertainty and information asymmetry concerning licensing contracts (Gans et 
al., 2008; Lichtenthaler, 2010).  8 
pipelines  across  stages.  Optimal  portfolios  of  drug  candidates  depend  upon  the 
combination of transition probabilities of clinical tests that are not directly observable. 
Given the combination of transition probabilities, the change of drug pipelines would 
dictate  a  licensing  decision  as  a  result of  the  portfolio  adjustment  process.  We  will 
hereafter refer to this causality as a portfolio effect. For example, a firm with relatively 
richer  drug  candidates  at  a  stage  compared  with  other  stages  given  the  transition 
probabilities constant would tend to license-out some of its drug candidates at that stage. 
On the other hand, if the number of drug candidates at a stage is diminishing compared to 
other stages, inward licensing at that stage would be promoted to level off the drug 
pipelines across stages. 
 
3.2. Measuring the change of drug pipelines 
As we will define fully in the subsequent section, we use three types of measures of drug 
pipelines: (i) the aggregate number of drug candidates across stages, (ii) the stage-specific 
number of drug candidates, and (iii) the relative numbers of drug candidates between 
adjacent  stages. The  basic  ideas  of  the  first  and  the  second  measures  are  relatively 
straightforward. Higher innovative performance would be reflected by the larger number 
of drug candidates.  
By contrast, the third  measure  would  be associated with  relative  innovative 
performance across stages. The innovative performance of the early stage relative to the 
drug discovery stage can be measured by the number of drug candidates at the early stage 
divided by research expenditures at the drug discovery stage. Unfortunately, research 
expenditures as well as the number of drug seeds at the drug discovery stage were not 
available to the present study. Therefore, we used patent stocks as the denominator.  
Concerning the relative productivity between the early and late stages, if success 
probabilities  of  clinical  testing  (which  are  basically  determined  by  firm-specific 
capabilities and institutional factors) are not virtually changed, the optimal structure of 
the drug pipelines will be stable and the innovative performance of the late stage relative 
to the early stage can be measured by the number of drug candidates at the late stage 
divided by the number of drug candidates at the early stage. If the structure of drug 
pipelines  varies,  however,  licensing  decisions  at  all  stages  will  accordingly  change 
depending on the portfolio effect.  9 
Possible other sources of variation in licensing decisions are the rent dissipation 
effect, revenue effect, and complementary assets. These  factors  would accentuate or 
offset the portfolio effect. Particularly, we suspect that (i) the relatively stronger rent 
dissipation effect compared to revenue effect may offset the portfolio effect, and (ii) 
downstream complementary assets may raise the optimal size of drug candidates at the 
late stage. We will clarify these points below. 
 
3.3. The portfolio effect on outward licensing 
License-out at the early stage 
If  the  innovative  productivities  at  both the  early  stage  and  the  late  stage  affect  the 
licensing decisions at the early stage distinctively in the opposite directions, this indicates 
the existence of the portfolio effect, which would lead to leveling off the drug pipelines. 
More specifically, higher innovative performance at the early stage leads to more drug 
candidates at the early stage. Therefore, the growth of drug candidates at the early stage 
would stimulate license-outs at the early stage for smoothing drug pipelines. For a similar 
reason,  the  increase  in  drug  candidates  at  the  late  stage  would  discourage  outward 
licensing at the early stage.  
 
License-out at the late stage 
The portfolio effect on outward licensing at the late stage can be explained in a similar 
manner.  That  is,  an  increase  of  drug  candidates  at  the  late  stage  would  stimulate 
license-outs at the late stage. In contrast, an increase of drug candidates at the early stage 
would discourage outward licensing at the late stage.  
It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  the  incentive  to  license-out  may  vary 
depending on the  magnitude of the rent dissipation effect relative to revenue effect. 
Although these two effects are not distinctively observable in the present study, the rent 
dissipation effect at the late stage should be much larger than the one at the early stage. 
This is because license-outs at the late stage would intensify product market competition 
in the near future. Thus, the rent dissipation effect at the late stage may outweigh the 
revenue effect as well as the portfolio effect. In addition, the large size of downstream 
complementary assets possibly discourages outward licensing at the late stage. Therefore, 
a firm with a large number of drug candidates at the late stage may be reluctant to engage 10 
in license-outs at that stage. 
 
3.4. The portfolio effect on inward licensing 
License-ins at the early stage 
The portfolio effect will have a similar impact upon inward licensing. More specifically, 
the growth of drug candidates at the early stage would discourage license-ins at the early 
stage, whereas the increase in drug candidates at the late stage would encourage inward 
licensing at the early stage in order to smooth out drug pipelines across stages. 
 
License-ins at the late stage 
A firm with more drug candidates at the late stage will reduce license-ins at that stage, 
while a firm with fewer drug candidates at the late stage will buy external drug candidates 
to  maintain  downstream  complementary  assets.  Therefore,  the  decrease  in  drug 
candidates at the late stage will result in a much higher likelihood of license-ins at the late 
stage.  
The  increase of drug candidates at the early stage  would encourage  inward 
licensing at the late stage. However, it should be noted that the complementary assets of a 
pharmaceutical  firm  are  not  malleable  and  most  relevant  expenditures  are  sunk. 
Therefore, a decrease of drug candidates at the early stage may not result in less inward 
licensing at the late stage. That is, the complementary assets may virtually predetermine 
the optimal size of drug candidates at the late stage: Inward licensing at the late stage may 
be strategically dictated by the size of the complementary assets and not by the number of 
drug candidates at the early stage. We will further discuss this issue in the subsequent 
sections. 
Our predictions regarding portfolio effects on license-outs and license-ins are 
summarized  in  Table  2.  The  plus  sign  means  the  positive  correlation  between  the 
innovative  productivities  of  clinical  testing  and  the  likelihood  of  licensing  at  a 
corresponding stage, while the minus sign represents the negative one. As shown in Table 
2,  the  portfolio  effect  would  produce  the  opposite  signs  within  a  column  set  of 
explanatory variables. Furthermore, we expect explanatory variables would produce the 
same signs of coefficients diagonally as well as off-diagonally. Note that, however, the 
rent dissipation effect may outweigh the portfolio effect at the late stage. Moreover, the 11 
presence of complementary assets would produce a strong incentive to hoard more drug 
candidates at the late stage of license-outs and at the early stage of license-ins. 
 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
 
3.5. Control factors 
Firm size 
As theoretically shown by Teece (1986) and Arora and Fosfuri (2003), complementary 
assets may reduce the propensity to license-out. Most literature regards firm size as the 
proxy for complementary assets. Unfortunately, there is conflicting evidence regarding 
the relationship between firm size and propensity for outward licensing. In Japan, for 
example, Ohnishi and Okada (2005) and Motohashi (2008) provided evidence that larger 
firms less frequently closed license-outs than smaller ones
6. On the contrary, Nakamura 
and Odagiri (2005) and Nagaoka and Kwon (2006) showed that larger firms were most 
likely to engage in license-outs
7. 
With regard to the relationship between firm size and inward licensing, Cohen 
and Levinthal (1989, 1990) convincingly argue that large firms have a greater absorptive 
capacity to assimilate and exploit existing outside technologies. There is a growing body 
of  literature which empirically  supports the positive effect of absorptive capacity on 
license-ins (Lichtenthaler, 2009; Lichtenthaler and Lichtenthaler, 2009; Eom and Lee, 
2010, among others). Thus, we expect that larger firms would maintain complementary 
assets at least partly by outsourcing external drug candidates. 
 
Therapeutic Diversity 
Pharmaceutical firms dealing with a  large number of therapeutic fields have a better 
capability to assimilate external knowledge. Specifically, co-specialized assets used in 
R&D, manufacturing, and marketing may be an important source of scope economies 
                                                   
6 Fosfuri (2006) and Arora and Ceccagnoli (2006) also obtained empirical evidence supporting the 
theoretical arguments by Teece (1986) and Arora and Fosfuri (2003). 
7 Gallini (1984) provided theoretical arguments supporting the positive relationship between firm size and 
license-outs: A dominant firm may strategically license-out its technologies in order to prevent competitors 
from developing better technologies. Rockett (1990) developed a similar argument, suggesting that a large 
firm  licenses  out  its  technologies  to  a  weak  rival  in  order  to  crowd  out  other  stronger  competitors. 
Furthermore, Kim (2004) suggested that a larger firm may not be worried with regard to an increase in 
competitors because of its dominant market position. 12 
(Henderson and Cockburn, 1996; Cockburn and Henderson, 2001). Thus, it will become 
much easier for a more diversified firm to assimilate a wide range of external knowledge; 
therefore, a firm dealing with more diverse therapeutic fields should be more inclined to 
close license-ins.  
  To  our  knowledge,  there  are  no  solid  theoretical  predictions  regarding  the 
relationship between therapeutic diversity and outward licensing. Lichtenthaler (2010) 
interestingly  found  a  positive  correlation  between  product  diversification  and 
license-outs, but without convincing arguments. Firms with diverse therapeutic fields 
probably find various types of potential licensees with more ease at either the upstream or 
downstream innovation process. 
 
Competitors in R&D and the product market 
Arora and Fosfuri (2003) indicate that outward licensing would be inhibited to some 
extent due to competition in R&D and the product market, assuming all else is equal. If 
technologies and markets are not differentiated, it is difficult to appropriate the outcome 
of R&D by a single firm. In this case, the rent dissipation effect caused by an additional 
competitor is expected to be smaller. On the other hand, the large number of potential 
licensees would mean more expected royalties from licensing (i.e., a stronger revenue 
effect). Thus, R&D competition would raise the profitability of  license-outs. Fosfuri 
(2006)  and  Kim  and  Vonotras  (2006) obtained  evidence  that  is  consistent  with  this 
argument. 
  There are very few empirical studies examining the competition effect on inward 
licensing. In very recent studies, Allain et al. (2010) and Grimpe and Hussinger (2010) 
indicated  that  technology  competition  has  a  positive  impact  on  the  propensity  to 
license-in.  In  a  similar  vein,  Lichtenthaler  (2010)  found  that  competition  fostered 
technology diffusion and enhanced the demand in technology markets. Therefore, the 
increase in competitors in R&D as well as the product market will raise the incentive to 
license-in as well as to license-out. 
 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
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4.1. Data 
We  obtained  data  on  54  pharmaceutical  firms  that  are  members  of  the  Japan 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (JPMA). JPMA is an industry association of 
research-oriented pharmaceutical manufacturers that has 68 members as of 2010. From 
the 68 firms, we excluded 14 firms which were 100% foreign-owned companies or whose 
main business lines were generic drugs, medical devices, or Chinese herbal medicines. 
Although foreign-owned companies have become increasingly present in the Japanese 
pharmaceutical market, the licensing determinants of foreign-owned companies located 
in  Japan  would  most  likely  be  different  from  those  of  the  Japanese  companies. 
Furthermore, it is very unlikely that R&D pipelines on generic drugs, medical devices, or 
Chinese  herbal  medicines  are  associated  with  the  licensing  decisions  regarding  new 
molecular entities (NMEs). 
The  complementary  nature  between  M&A  and  licensing  provokes  concerns 
about endogeneity regarding licensing decisions. Fortunately, however, there were very 
few M&A in the Japanese pharmaceutical industry until quite recently. Hence, M&A as a 
missing explanatory variable would not cause very serious endogeneity issues.
8 
We used three types of data: the number of licenses, drug pipelines, and firm 
characteristics. Data sources for these are described as follows. 
 
Licensing 
We investigated the licensing contracts of the 54 firms through websites, financial reports, 
and Asuno-Shinyaku (Technomics, Inc.). Asuno-Shinyaku is a comprehensive database of 
drug developments and alliances for Japanese pharmaceutical firms. Asuno-Shinyaku 
collects information through various sources such as publications, news releases, and 
interviews. Using these data sources, we collected the data on 329 license-outs and 434 
license-ins from 1997 to 2007. 
 
                                                   
8 Horizontal M&A between major Japanese pharmaceutical companies have occurred since 2005, such as 
Tanabe and Mitsubishi Pharma in 2005 (the present name is Tanabe-Mitsubishi), Fujisawa and Yamanouchi 
in 2005 (Astellas), Dainippon and Sumitomo in 2005 (Dainippon-Sumitomo), and Daiichi and Sankyo in 
2007 (Daiichi-Sankyo). Resulting changes of pipelines may provoke concerns about empirical regularities; 
therefore, for a robustness check we used data from 1997 to 2005 instead. We found virtually similar results 
for the years 1997–2007. Therefore, the present paper mainly used the larger dataset for 1997 to 2007. 
Regarding consolidated firms within our observation period, we collected data on firm characteristics at the 
time when licensing contracts were closed. 14 
Drug pipelines 
Next, the data on drug pipelines for the 54 firms were extracted from Pharmaprojects 
(Informa UK Ltd.). In addition, we divided drug candidates for the pipelines into 16 
therapeutic fields using the Anatomical Therapeutic Classification (ATC) prepared by the 




Finally,  we  collected  information  about  firm  characteristics  such  as  firm  size  and 
therapeutic diversity. We collected data on drug sales except for non-drug business sales 
from Katsudo Gaikyo Chosa (annual questionnaire surveys conducted by the JPMA). We 
also collected data on individual sales in the 16 therapeutic fields for each firm from the 
IMS World Review (IMS Health). 
 
4.2. Empirical specifications 
Our basic empirical specification is  
it t i it
k
s Z k s           )   stage at    pipelines   of   state ( )   stage at    license   of   (#
   
it  
 
where subscript i shows a firm and t represents a year. The stage s or k  represents either 
the early or the late stage, as defined previously. The dependent variable is either the 
number of license-outs or license-ins. We use several dependent variables for license-outs 
and license-ins alternatively. Specifically, regarding license-outs, out_total is the total 
number of license-outs, and out_early (out_late) is the number of license-outs at the early 
stage (late stage). We define in_total, in_early, and in_late regarding license-ins in a 
similar way. 
k
s  is an estimated parameter for the state of pipelines at stage k  in which 
the corresponding dependent variable is the number of licenses at stage s . Specifically, 
there  are  four  combinations  of  stage s  and  stage  k in 
k
s  .  That  is,  we  have  four 
parameters of 
e
E  , 
l
E  , 
e
L  , and 
l
L   where subscript E  (L) indicates the early stage of 
licensing (late stage of licensing) and superscript e (l) indicates the early stage of drug 
                                                   
9 ATC comprises: (1) alimentary T. & metabolism, (2) blood & B. forming organs, (3) cardiovascular 
system,  (4)  dermatologicals,  (5)  G.U.  System  &  sex  hormones,  (6)  systemic  hormones,  (7)  systemic 
anti-infectives, (8) hospital solutions, (9) antineoplast & immunomodul, (10) musculo-skeletal system, (11) 
central nervous system, (12) parasitology, (13) respiratory system, (14) sensory organs, (15) diagnostic 
agents, and (16) various. 15 
pipelines  (late  stage  of  drug  pipelines).  Z  represents  the  column  vector  of  control 
variables,  and   is  the  row  vector of corresponding parameters. Finally,  i   shows a 
fixed effect for firm i,  t   represents year dummies, and  it   is an error term. 
  This specification raises concerns about possible endogeneity due to reverse 
causality: Drug pipelines influencing a firm’s license are themselves influenced by the 
firm’s  licensing  activity
10. In order to cope with th e  endogeneity,  we  will use  the 
fixed-effect GMM. GMM is an extremely general framework because an error term is not 
assumed to be  . . . d i i  Instrumental variables should correlate with drug pipelines but be 
exogenous  to  the  dependent  variable.  We  use  both  one-year  and  two-year  lagged 
variables of drug pipelines as instruments because they are assuredly correlated with 
present  drug  pipelines  but they  are  not  presumably correlated with  present  licensing 
decisions. The J-test supports the validity of the instrumental variables
11.  
 
Drug pipelines and the portfolio effect 
We examine the portfolio effect on licensing by using three different specifications. As a 
first step, we employ regressions with either the total number of license-outs (out_total) 
or the total number of license-ins (in_total) as a dependent variable. The total number of 
drug candidates (p_total) is a key independent variable. That is, 
. ) _ (  
_
or        
   
it  












Second,  we  use  a  stage-specific  number  of  licensing  (out_early,  out_late, 
in_early, or in_late) as a dependent variable. Then we incorporate both the number of 
drug candidates at the early stage (p_early) and that of drug candidates at the late stage 
(p_late) as independent variables reflecting the state of pipelines. That is, 
                                                   
10 According to the Pharmaproject data, a licensed drug candidate in a certain year is included in the drug 
pipeline  in the  same  year. Therefore, this  could  partially  offset  the  true negative  correlation  between 
license-ins and drug candidates in the same year. 
11 According to  Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistics   (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006),  the  null of  a  weak 
instrument is significantly rejected. If we use three-year lagged variables as instruments, weak instruments 
are detected. Thus, we determined that the combination of one -year and two-year lagged variables of 
instruments is suitable for our estimation. 16 
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where subscript  E  (L)  indicates that licensing occurs at the early  stage (late stage); 
meanwhile, superscript e (l) indicates that a corresponding explanatory variable is the 
number of drug candidates at the early stage (late stage). 
Finally, as alternative independent variables for drug pipelines, we incorporate 
the measures of innovative productivity, as  mentioned  in Section 3.2. We define the 
innovative productivity at the early stage as the number of drug candidates at the early 
stage divided by patent stocks (i.e.,  stock pat early p _ _ / )
12. We employ a conventionally 
used measure of patent stock ( stock pat_ ) as a proxy for the research expenditure at the 
early stage (Lach, 1995). In pharmaceutical research, a patent should be filed relatively 
early in the drug discovery process, probably due to low imitation costs. Therefore, patent 
stock can be regarded as the research input at the drug discovery stage.  
Similarly, we define the state of pipelines by the number of drug candidates at 
the  late  stage  divided  by  the  number  of  drug  candidates  at  the  early  stage  (i.e., 
early p late p _ _ / ).  We  introduce  stock pat early p _ _ /  and  early p late p _ _ /  as  independent 
variables, and the stage-specific number of licensing ( early out_ ,  late out_ ,  early in_ , or 
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12 We collected pharmaceutical patent applications defined by IPC: A61K. Patent stock is constructed 
following  the  conventional method in the literature.  See, for  example,  Lach  (1995).  We  used a 20% 
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4.3. Control variables 
We adopted three types of controls in regressions, firm size, therapeutic diversity, and 
competitors in both R&D and the product market, as mentioned in Section 3.5. We briefly 




Firm size can be regarded as the proxy for complementary assets. We employed drug 
sales (sales) representing a firm size. We used the Corporate Goods Price Index (GCPI, 
Bank of Japan) as a deflator of drug sales given 2000 as a base year.  
 
Therapeutic diversity 
We defined the therapeutic diversity index of sales (scope). We classified drug sales into 
16 therapeutic fields according to the ATC, and calculated the Herfindahl index (H) based 
on the sales share. Then we defined the diversity index as  H / 1 .  
 
R&D and market competition 
We constructed two types of competition indices either at the clinical testing stage (i.e., 
from pre-clinical to phase III) or at the product market stage (i.e., at the PMS stage). We 
constructed  the  competition  index  at  the  clinical  stage  (comp_develop)  using  the 
Herfindahl  index  weighted  by  the  number  of  drug  candidates.  In  a  similar  way,  we 
defined  the  competition  index  at  the  product  market  stage  (comp_market)  by  the 
Herfindahl index weighted by drug sales of the 16 ATC categories. Table 3 summarizes 
variable definitions and basic statistics. 
 
                                                   
13 See the Appendix for more detail regarding variable constructions on therapeutic diversity as well as 
either R&D or market competition. In unreported regressions, we employed sales growth as an additional 
explanatory variable, since this could be a mitigating factor against the rent dissipation effect (see Fosfuri, 
2006). However, we could not obtain any significant results on this variable. Therefore, we omitted a sales 
growth variable in the present study. 18 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
 
 
5. Estimation results 
 
We present our estimation results in the order of the three sets of empirical specifications. 
Note that, in the previous section, we defined three measures of drug pipelines: (i) the 
aggregate  number  of  drug  candidates  across  stages  (p_total),  (ii)  the  stage-specific 
number of drug candidates (p_early and p_late), and (iii) the relative numbers of drug 
candidates  between  adjacent  stages  ( stock pat early p _ _ /  and  early p late p _ _ / ). 
Correspondingly, we defined dependent variables as out_total and in_total for the first 
definition,  and  out_early,  out_late,  in_early,  and  in_late  for  the  second  and  third 
definitions.  
 
5.1. Aggregate number of drug candidates across stages 
Table  4  presents  the  estimation  results  with  the  total  number  of  outward  licenses 
(out_total) and inward licenses (in_total) as dependent variables. Independent variables 
are  the  total  number  of  drug  pipelines  (p_total),  real  drug  sales  (sales), therapeutic 
diversity  (scope),  competition  indexes  (comp_develop  and  comp_market),  and  year 
dummies  (d_year).  The  variable  p_total  is  regarded  as  endogenous,  thereby  the 
combination  of  one-year  and  two-year  lagged  variables  is  used  as  an  instrument  in 
fixed-effect GMM. 
 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
 
  The  most  interesting  outcome  of  Table  4  is  that  the  total  number  of  drug 
pipelines has a significant impact on outward and inward licensing in opposite directions. 
That is, the coefficient of the total number of drug candidates (p_total) is positive for the 
total  number  of  license-outs  (out_total)  at  the  5%  significance  level,  whereas  it  is 
negative for the total number of license-ins (in_total) at the 1% significance level
14. The 
                                                   
14 Concerns about multicollinearity between sales and p_total led us to exclude either one of these variables, 19 
negative relationship between drug pipelines and inward licensing is consistent with the 
results found in Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) and Danzon et al. (2007).  
  Most control variables have no significant impact on licensing except for sales 
and comp_develop. The coefficient of sales is positive for the total number of inward 
licenses (in_total) at the 1% significance level. This indicates that a large firm is eager to 
engage in license-ins, possibly for the purpose of maintaining existent complementary 
assets. Competition at the development stage (comp_develop) has a positive impact on 
the total number of license-outs (out_total) at the 5% significance level.  
 
5.2. Stage-specific number of drug candidates 
Next, we employed the second empirical specification of stage-specific determinants of 
license-outs and license-ins at either the early or the late stage. Table 5 shows estimation 
results. The dependent variables are out_early, out_late, in_early, and in_late. We used 
the number of drug candidates both at the early stage (p_early) and at the late stage 
(p_late) as our key independent variables in this specification. Control variables are the 
same as the ones in Table 4.  
 
 [Insert Table 5 around here] 
 
License-outs 
Equations (1) and (2) in Table 5 present the determinants of license-outs at the early stage 
and late stage, respectively. First, we found that out_early in Eq. (1) positively correlated 
with p_early but negatively correlated with p_late. This combination of the opposite 
signs of the pipeline variables is consistent with our prediction in Table 2, indicating the 
presence of the portfolio effect on outward licensing at the early stage. 
  Next, in Eq. (2) in Table 5, the coefficient of p_late is negative and significant 
but the one for p_early has no significant impact on  out_late. These results are not 
consistent with our prediction regarding the portfolio effect. One possible reason is that 
license-outs at the late stage may be subject to much a stronger rent dissipation effect than 
at the early stage. That is, license-outs at the late stage can induce fiercer competition in 
                                                                                                                                                     
although the estimation results showed the same signs with a virtually similar significance level as those of 
our basic model above. 20 
the near future due to a much shorter gestation lag of clinical tests for the drug candidates. 
Another possible reason is that a firm with a large number of drug candidates at the late 
stage already owns large complementary assets, so that it has to maintain and efficiently 
use the downstream assets instead of licensing drug candidates outward. 
  Furthermore, from Tables 4 and 5, we obtained the positive although weakly 
significant relationship between the frequency of outward licensing and the degree of 
competition at the development stage (comp_develop). This indicates that, with many 
competing  drugs  at  the  development  stage,  it  would  be  difficult  to  appropriate  the 
technologies of a relevant therapeutic field from other competitors and potential licensees. 
Accordingly, the expected return of a drug candidate in the future would be lower. In 
these circumstances, the revenue effect may outweigh the rent dissipation effect so that a 
pharmaceutical firm will likely be more inclined to license-out drug candidates (Arora 
and Fosfuri, 2003). 
 
License-ins 
Equations (3) and (4) in Table 5 summarize the determinants of license-ins at the early 
stage and late stage, respectively. First, what we found significant was that in_late in Eq. 
(4) positively correlated with p_early whereas it negatively correlated with p_late. The 
combined result of the opposite signs indicates the presence of the portfolio effect on 
inward  licensing at the late stage. Moreover, the coefficient of  sales  is significantly 
positive on in_late. This indicates that larger downstream complementary assets would 
facilitate inward licensing at the late stage. 
With regard to in_early in Eq. (3) in Table 5, the coefficient of p_early is weakly 
significant and negative as expected, while the coefficient of p_late is not significant. 
Thus, although fewer drug candidates at the early stage may accelerate license-ins at the 
early stage, the attrition of drug candidates at the late stage rather stimulates license-ins at 
the late stage, as shown in Eq. (4).  
 
5.3. Relative numbers of drug candidates between adjacent stages 
For  the  purpose  of  a  robustness  check,  we  further  employed  the  third  empirical 
specification with relative numbers of drug candidates between two adjacent stages as 
alternative variables for drug pipelines. We incorporated the two innovative measures 21 
defined  in  Section  3.2  as  p_early  /  pat_stock  and  p_late  /  p_early  into  the  third 
specification. Table 6 shows the estimation results. 
 
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
 
License-outs 
Equations (1) and (2) in Table 6 present the determinants of license-outs at the early stage 
and  late  stage,  respectively.  First,  in  Eq.  (1)  we  found  that  the  dependent  variable 
( early out_ )  positively  correlated  with  the  innovative  performance  at  the  early  stage 
( stock pat early p _ / _ ), while it negatively correlated with the innovative performance at 
the late stage ( early p late p _ / _ ). The combined result of the opposite signs in Eq. (1) for 
pipeline variables indicates the presence of the portfolio effect on license-outs at the early 
stage, similar to the previous specification.  
Next, in Eq. (2) in Table 6, the coefficient of  stock pat early p _ / _  is negative and 
significant but the coefficient of  early p late p _ / _  has no significant impact on out_late. 
Although the negative coefficient of  stock pat early p _ / _  is expected in Table 2, these 
results  from  Tables  5  and  6  suggest  that the  portfolio  effect  for  license-outs  is  not 
significant at the late stage.  
  Finally, we obtained weakly significant coefficients for comp_develop in both 
Eqs. (1) and (2) in Table 6. Recall that the coefficients of comp_develop are also weakly 
significant and positive in Tables 4 and 5. Therefore, competition at the development 
stage possibly stimulates license-outs. A possible reason is that, as suggested before, the 
revenue effect outweighs the rent dissipation effect so that license-outs of drug candidates 
become increasingly active. 
 
License-ins 
Equations (3) and (4) in Table 6 show the determinants of license-ins at the early stage 
and  late  stage,  respectively.  First,  in_late  in  Eq.  (4)  positively  correlated  with 
stock pat early p _ / _ , whereas it negatively correlated with  early p late p _ / _ . The opposite 
correlations indicate the presence of the portfolio effect on inward licensing at the late 
stage. In addition, the coefficient of sales is significantly positive on in_late in the same 22 
way in Table 5. 
Concerning in_early in Eq. (3) in Table 6, the coefficient of  stock pat early p _ / _  
is weakly significant and negative as expected, while the coefficient of  early p late p _ / _  is 
not significant. This is virtually the same as the results shown in Table 5.  
 
  In sum, we found that the Japanese pharmaceutical companies evened out drug 
pipelines by licensing-out at the early stage and by licensing-in at the late stage. It is safe 
to say that licensing is a significant means of smoothing the state of drug pipelines across 
stages, even though license-outs at the late stage may be influenced by the rent dissipation 





The present paper examined a portfolio effect, namely, how a portfolio of drug candidates 
affected  stage-specific  licensing  by  the  Japanese  pharmaceutical  companies.  We 
classified the timing of licensing and drug pipelines into an early and a late stage for the 
purpose of examining stage-specific incentives to license, which have not been fully 
explored in previous studies.  
  Our empirical results are summarized as follows. The state of drug pipelines 
significantly  affected  licensing  decisions  at the  early  and  late  stages  even  when  we 
controlled for firm size, therapeutic diversity, and the degree of competition. In particular, 
the Japanese pharmaceutical companies leveled off drug pipelines by either license-outs 
at the early stage or license-ins at the late stage. That is, the number of drug candidates at 
the early stage positively correlated with license-outs (license-ins) at the early stage (late 
stage). Further, the number of drug candidates at the late stage negatively correlated with 
license-outs (license-ins) at the early stage (late stage). The combined results of the 
opposite impacts of the pipeline on licensing indicate that licensing plays a significant 
role in smoothing out the state of drug pipelines across stages. 
  In contrast, we could not find a significant impact of the portfolio effect on 
license-outs  at  the  late  stage.  A  possible  reason  is  that  the  rent  dissipation  effect 23 
dominates the portfolio effect at the late stage. Another possible reason is that a large 
number of drug candidates at the late stage would require a large size of complementary 
assets, so that it was preferable to maintain and efficiently use the downstream assets to 
license-out drug candidates. With respect to license-ins at the early stage, the exhaustion 
of drug candidates at the late stage stimulated license-ins at the late stage, although fewer 
drug candidates at the early stage accelerated license-ins at the early stage. 
  This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. Most previous empirical 
studies focused on the determinants of license-outs, mainly referring to complementary 
assets  and  revenue  and/or  the  rent  dissipation  effect.  The  present  paper,  however, 
considered  explicitly  how  an  R&D  portfolio  of  drug  pipelines  affected  licensing 
decisions, controlling for firm size, therapeutic diversity, and competitors in R&D and 
product markets. Furthermore, we examined both outward and inward licensing. Thus, 
our analysis offers a more complete and clear picture of a firm’s involvement in markets 
for technology. 
  This  paper  has  several  limitations.  First,  our  dataset  consisted  of  licensing 
contracts of drug candidates. The present study did not use information on other types of 
licenses,  such  as  research  tools  and  biotechnologies.  These  restrictions  may 
underestimate the growing role of technology markets in pharmaceutical R&D.  
  Second, we did not consider the economic value of a licensing contract. The 
value of a drug candidate differs significantly according to licensing stage and potential 
market size. However, the changing features of option values at different stages would 
demand further information on therapeutically distinctive market conditions and may 
require a more complicated exploration strategy. 
  Finally,  we  could  not  introduce  pairwise  controls  of  the  characteristics  of 
licensors and licensees, as was done by Kim and Vonotras (2006), mainly due to data 
restrictions. This requires broader and more comprehensive data collection. It is natural to 
consider license-ins and license-outs to be jointly determined by a pharmaceutical firm. 
Therefore, it is desirable to estimate simultaneously the determinants of license-ins and 
license-outs. This remains to be examined in future empirical research. 
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Appendix:  
Variable construction on therapeutic diversity and competition indexes 
 
Therapeutic diversity 
We calculate sales share  ikt T  in each of the 16 therapeutic fields of ATC, 
 
k
ikt T 1 
where k represents a therapeutic field (1, 2, …, K), i is a firm (1, 2, …, N), and t denotes 
the  year.  Then,  we  construct  the  therapeutic  diversity  of  the  firm,  scope,  using  the 
Herfindahl index of  
k
it ikt H T









The degree of competition in R&D 
First, we calculate the competition index at the development stage, comp_develop, as 
follows. We calculate the share of drug candidates across firms,  ikt X , in each of the 16 
therapeutic fields of ATC.  
 
i
ikt X 1  
where k represents a therapeutic field (1, 2, …, K), i is a firm (1, 2, …, N), and t denotes 
the year. Thereafter, we create the diversity index  kt C  in each therapeutic field through 
the Herfindahl index  
i
kt ikt A X
















The degree of competition in product market  
Next, we calculate sales share  ikt S  in each of the 16 therapeutic fields of ATC.  
 
i
ikt S 1  
where k represents a therapeutic field (1, 2, …, K), i is a firm (1, 2, …, N), and t denotes 
the year. Thereafter, we create the diversity index  kt D  in each therapeutic field through 
the Herfindahl index  
i
kt ikt B S








Finally, we obtain the competition index in the product market, comp_market, based on 
ikt S  and  kt D  as follows: 
. _ kt
k
ikt it D S market comp  
 
 
Thus, the competition index of comp_market is defined using the Herfindahl index  kt B
weighted by drug sales  ikt S in 16 ATC therapeutic markets.  
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1 
Drug innovation process and corresponding licensing stages 
 
Note: The upper part of the figure shows the innovation process from drug discovery to post-market 
surveillance. The lower part of the figure depicts the authors’ classification of drug pipelines. See the text 




   









Number of licenses with foreign and domestic partners by pharmaceutical firms in Japan 
 
 












in out in out in out in out in out in out in out in out in out in out in out
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
domestic partners
foreign partners
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2002 2007
Total number 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
License-ins 20 32 38 48 54 49 37 38 39 44 35 434




Stage-specific licensing: Annual average number of licenses per firm from 1997 to 2007 
 
Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 






Total Early stage Late stage Total Early stage Late stage
Large 2.19 0.85 1.35 0.79 0.24 0.55
sales≧400 (1.79) (0.98) (0.64) (1.10) (0.55) (0.33)
Medium 0.74 0.37 0.37 0.88 0.40 0.48
400＞sales＞100 (0.82) (0.59) (0.34) (1.07) (0.63) (0.42)
Small 0.62 0.29 0.33 0.50 0.23 0.27
100≧sales (0.92) (0.62) (0.32) (0.88) (0.53) (0.35)
0.83 0.38 0.46 0.63 0.27 0.35













   
Early stage Late stage Early stage Late stage
Innovative productivity
at the early stage ＋ － － ＋(?)
Innovative productivity
at the late stage





Definition and basic statistics of variables (units: 54 firms, year: 1997–2007) 
 
Note 1: See section 2.1 for the division of licensing and pipeline stages. 
Note 2: See section 4.3 and the Appendix for the detailed definition of therapeutic diversity and competition 
indexes. 
   
Variable Definition Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
License-outs Number of outward licensing
  out_total      Total number 524 0.63 0.94 0 5
  out_early      Early stage 524 0.27 0.57 0 3
  out_late      Late stage 524 0.35 0.68 0 4
License-ins Number of inward licensing
  in_total      Total number 524 0.83 1.14 0 8
  in_early      Early stage 524 0.38 0.69 0 5
  in_late      Late stage 524 0.46 0.80 0 5
R&D Pipeline
  p_total Total number of drug pipelines 524 28.65 24.24 0 165
  p_early Drug pipelines at the early stage 524 5.75 5.71 0 36
  p_late Drug pipelines at the late stage 524 22.90 19.92 0 133
  pat_stock Patent stock (20% depreciation rate) 513 83.00 99.78 0 632.56
  p_early / pat_stock p_early divided by pat_stock 506 0.13 0.12 0.01 1.33
  p_late / p_early p_late divided by p_early 524 4.05 3.17 0 26
Controls
  sales Real drug sales (hundred billion yen in 2000) 501 1.48 2.12 0.02 15.09
  scope Therapeutic diversity index in drug sales 491 3.32 1.51 1.00 7.73
  comp_develop Competition index at the development stage 504 15.28 4.09 4.71 27.97




Estimation result of aggregate number of drug candidates across stages 
 
Note 1: *** 1%, ** 5% 
2: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
3: Instrumented: p_total. Instruments: One- and two-year lagged p_total. 
 
 















Number of observations 359 359














Estimation results of stage-specific number of drug candidates 
 
Note 1: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
2: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
3: Instrumented: p_early and p_late. Instruments: One- and two-year lagged p_early and p_late. 
 
   
(1) (2) (3) (4)
out_early out_late in_early in_late
R&D Pipeline
0.092*** 0.048 －0.058* 0.100***
(0.034) (0.031) (0.036) (0.036)
－0.049* －0.071** －0.030 －0.081***
(0.029) (0.033) (0.028) (0.030)
Controls
0.099 0.227 0.215 0.661***
(0.152) (0.138) (0.182) (0.201)
0.153* 0.138 0.014 0.193*
(0.089) (0.116) (0.097) (0.117)
0.021* 0.024* －0.003 －0.021
(0.013) (0.015) (0.027) (0.037)
0.011 －0.014 －0.121 －0.087
(0.056) (0.067) (0.101) (0.090)
　　　d_year yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 359 359 359 359




















Estimation results of relative numbers of drug candidates between adjacent stages 
 
Note 1: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
2: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
3: Instrumented: p_early / pat_stock and p_late / p_early. Instruments: One- and two-year lagged p_early / 






(1) (2) (3) (4)
out_early out_late in_early in_late
R&D Pipeline
2.729** －2.437* －2.648* 3.037**
(0.136) (1.400) (1.566) (1.524)
－0.068** －0.070 －0.025 －0.099**
(0.032) (0.056) (0.046) (0.040)
Controls
0.001 0.004 0.023 0.440***
(0.066) (0.076) (0.176) (0.171)
0.080 0.142 0.076 0.152
(0.106) (0.128) (0.120) (0.118)
0.034* 0.035* 0.006 －0.016
(0.020) (0.020) (0.032) (0.036)
－0.046 －0.013 －0.076 －0.143
(0.063) (0.079) (0.093) (0.109)
　　　d_year yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 350 350 350 350
Number of groups 46 46 46 46
Hansen J statistics
2.577
(p = 0.275)
3.803
(p = 0.163)
2.264
(p = 0.322)
1.286
(p = 0.525)
　　　scope
　　　comp_develop
　　　comp_market
License-outs License-ins
　　　p_early / pat_stock
　　　p_late / p_early
　　　sales